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NOTES
Bankruptcy: Liability of Drawee Bank in Voluntary Proceed-
ings: Between August 27, 1963 and September 17, 1963, Matin Sea-
foods drew and delivered five checks to Eureka Fisheries, totalling
$2,318.82. The checks were drawn upon Marin's commercial account
in the Bank of Marin. On September 26, 1963, Marin Seafoods filled
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for the
Northern District of California, and a receiver in bankruptcy was
appointed.1 On October 2, 1963 Eureka Fisheries presented the
checks which Marin Seafoods had delivered to them, and these
checks were paid by the Bank of Marin. When the bank paid these
checks, it had received no notice of the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, and, in fact, it was not so informed until October 3, 1963,
when it received a letter dated October 2, 1963. The receiver, John
England, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy on October 20, 1963;
and when he learned that the bank had honored the checks, he ap-
plied to the referee in bankruptcy for a turnover order 2 in the
amount of the honored checks, alternatively against the Bank of
Marin and Eureka Fisheries. The referee held that the bank and
Eureka were jointly liable to the trustee for the amount paid by
the bank to Eureka. The District Court affirmed the decision of the
referee, and the Ninth Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision upon
the appeal of the Bank of Marin. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a drawee bank is not liable for honoring checks
drawn before the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, but pre-
sented for payment after the filing, where it had not received actual
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings.4
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 initially provided that the title to the
bankrupt's property vested in the trustee as of the date of the first ad-
judication of bankruptcy. 5 The courts, however, utilized a legal fiction
in dealing with the title, reasoning that the title which the trustee re-
' Bankruptcy Act §59, 52 Stat. 868 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §95(a) (1964).2 Bankruptcy Act §2(a) (15), 52 STAT. 842 (1958), 11U.S.C. §11(a) (15) (1964).
3352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
4 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966). The trustee claimed that the
question was moot, since the joint judgment had been paid by the payee,
Eureka Fisheries. The Court decided that the question of the bank's liability
was still in issue, since the payee had served on the bank a demand for con-
tribution. Mr. Justice Fortas, in his dissenting opinion, took the position that
there was no real controversy here, since the payment by the payee removed
any element of adversity between the trustee and the bank. His recommenda-
tion was to vacate the judgment and remand the case for dismissal. Bank of
Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 111 (1966). The effect of such a decision
would merely be to cause more litigation, since the payee would then be
forced to litigate the issue of the bank's liability.
5 "Adjudication shall mean a determination, whether by decree or by operation
of Law, that a person is bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act §1 (2), 73 Stat. 109 (1959),
11 U. S. C. §1(2) (1964).
ceived at the adjudication related back to the date of the filing of the
petition.6 This principle was applied quite literally by the courts, and the
date of the filing of the petition was the absolute date of cleavage regard-
ing any transfers: "The filing of the petition in bankruptcy is a caveat
to all the world, and, in effect, an attachment and injunction."'
It was soon recognized that the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
as a matter of commercial usage, was not an efficient type of notice by
which to put third parties on their guard in dealing with the bankrupt.
An exception to the general rule began to develop, although the devel-
opment was, at best, highly confusing. When an otherwise innocent third
party would deal with the bankrupt, and have no practical means of
ascertaining that a petition had been filed, transfers by the bankrupt
were occasionally sustained on equitable grounds." In the case of Citizens
Union National Bank v. Johnson,9 the payee had presented checks,
drawn by the bankrupt before the filing of the petition, after the filing
of an involuntary petition but before there had been an adjudication.
The bank had received no notice of the filing, and promptly paid the
checks in the normal course of business. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals said:
"We think that the conclusion that the bank is liable for pay-
ments made in good faith to third parties and in ignorance of
the bankruptcy proceedings is not well founded. Its effect would
be that the bank could not protect itself against liability to a
trustee in bankruptcy subsequently appointed on account of
payments made in good faith in the regular course of business,
and in ignorance of the bankruptcy proceedings."' 0
But equity protected innocent third parties, including drawee banks,
only if the transfer occurred before an adjudication."
'Questions concerning the validity of the relation-back principle, the
sustaining of transfers between filing and adjudication, and the summary
invalidation of all transfers after adjudication upon action by the trustee,
contributed to a wide-spread confusion in court decisions. In an effort
to provide a uniform rule, the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1938
by the Chandler Act.' 2 Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act now pro-
vided that the title to the property of the bankrupt vests in the trustee
. . upon his appointment, . . ." as of the date of the filing of the
6 Everette v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 478 (1913) ; Andrews v. Partridge, 228 U.S.
479, 481 (1913) ; Fairbanks Shovel v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642, 649 (1916).
SMueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14 (1901). Cf. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S.
111, 117 (1925) ; Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263, 266 (1914).8 See In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D.C. S.D. N.Y.
1935); In re Mertens, 144 Fed. 818, 823 (2d Cir. 1906); In re Perpall, 271
F. 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1921) ; In re Zotti, 186 F. 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1911).
9286 F. 527, (6th Cir. 1922).
10 Id. at 528.
"1 See note 8 supra.
1252 Stat. 840 (1938).
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petition.13 Although this was an obvious effort to eliminate any relation-
back principle, by providing that filing and adjudication would be
simultaneous, the effort was not totally successful. Because of the use
of the phrase ". .. upon his appointment," there is still an interval when
there is no title. The effect of the section is to have the trustee's title
relate back to the date of the filing of the petition, despite the efforts
of the writers of the new section.
The draftsmen included section 70(d)14 in the new Bankruptcy Act
to provide for this interval. This section spells out the exceptions to the
general rule, by providing that the types of transfer there enumerated
would be valid in the interval between the filing and the adjudication.
The section is exclusive, and the courts have quite generally refused
to extend the protection of the section past its literal wording.1 In an
attempt to extend the protection to an insurance company which had
made a transfer of the cash surrender value of a bankrupt's life insu-
rance policy to the bankrupt after the filing of a petition, but before an
adjudication, the court said:
"There is almost always some injustice or hardship which attends
transactions occuring after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
Whether the line which has been drawn is the best possible solu-
tion of the problem is not for the courts to say. The line in fact
has been drawn by competent authority and it is no longer neces-
sary for the courts to make the attempt, which has not been con-
spicuously successful in the past, to decide cases on the facts as
they arise."1 6
The courts have recognized that there are inequities whenever an arbi-
trary cut-off point is adopted, but they have all agreed that the equities
in such a situation weigh more heavily in favor of the trustee.
In 1959 Section 18(f), 11 dealing with voluntary petitions in bank-
ruptcy, was added to the Bankruptcy Act. The purpose of this section
is, in all cases of a voluntary petition, to make the date of the filing
operate as the date of the adjudication. The seeming effect of this merger
is to remove voluntary petitions from the operation of section 70(d).
Since there is no longer any interval between the filing and the adjudi-
cation in a voluntary proceeding, it seems that the exceptions in section
70(d) are not applicable to a voluntary proceeding. If this were the
case, there could never be a valid transfer by a bankrupt after a volun-
tary petition has been filed. But the Main case goes one step beyond
13 Bankruptcy Act §70(a), 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §110(a) (1964).
14 Bankruptcy Act §70(d), 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §110(d) (1964).
15 "Except as provided in this subdivision, no transfer by or on behalf of the
bankrupt after the date of the bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee."
Bankruptcy Act §70(d) (5), 52 Stat. 884 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §110(d) (5) (1964).
16 Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co., 218 F.2d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1955). Cf.
Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1959).
17 Bankruptcy Act §18(f), 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S. C. §41 (f) (1964).
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this reasoning, and provides an exception for the seeming iron-clad rule
of sections 70(d) (5) and 18(f).
The law of negotiable instruments has been well settled for some
time on the point that the mere issuance of a check is not a transfer as
between the drawer and the drawee within the meaning of section
70(d) (5).:1 The transfer occurs when the check is presented for pay-
ment by the payee and is paid by the drawee. In the Mlarrn case, under
the above rule, the transfer did occur after the filing of the voluntary
petition. So, under section 18(f), there was, at least technically, an in-
valid transfer within the meaning of 70(d) (5), and the trustee would
seem to be entitled to avoid it. But the Supreme Court does not so
conclude. One of the prime arguments by the Bank of Marin was based
on the case of Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust."9 In that case the
bankrupt had filed a petition for reorganization, which was approved on
the same day.20 Subsequently, the bank honored checks which were
drawn by the bankrupt before the filing of the petition. The bank was
held not liable to the trustee for the amount of the payments. The
theory of the court in that case revolved around the negotiability pro-
viso in section 70(d) (5)21. As the dissenting opinion pointed out in the
Marin case, 22 the Rosenthal rationale has been severly criticized on sev-
eral grounds: the mere presentation and payment of a check by a drawee
bank is not strictly a negotiation, and this interpretation of the nego-
tiability proviso is not in accordance with the other provisions of section
70(d) (5). Although the dissenting opinion criticizes the majority upon
this point, the fact is that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme
Court approached an application of the Rosenthal rationale. The Court
of Appeals rather summarily dismissed this argument of the bank,23 and
the only reliance which the Supreme Court placed on the case was in
its determination that certiorari should be granted because of the impor-
tance of the question presented under the facts.24
There were two broad grounds upon which the Supreme Court re-
lied in its determination of the issue. The first was the very nature of
the deposit contract between the depositor and the bank. Under this
18 This point was initially settled, despite some previous doubt, by the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, §189, and is now codified in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, §3-409(1): "A check or other draft does not, of itself, operate
as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its
payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it."
19 139 F. Supp. 730 (D.C. La. 1948).
20 The filing and approval of a petition for corporate reorganization is similar
to the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, in so far as the effect of
both procedures is the same as that of an adjudication. Bankruptcy Act §102,
52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §502 (1964).
21 "Provided, however, that nothing in this title shall impair the negotiability or
currency of negotiable instruments." Bankruptcy Act §70(d) (5), 52 Stat. 884
(1938), 11 U.S.C. §110(d)(5) (1964).22 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 104 (1966).
23 Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 189 (1965).24 Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 100 (1966).
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contract, the bank has both the right and the duty to honor all checks
which are properly drawn upon it; if it does not fulfill this duty, it may
be liable in an action for wrongful dishonor.25 In conjunction with the
nature of the deposit contract, the court applied the following principle:
".. . the rule applicable to this and to all similar cases is that
the trustee takes the property not as an innocent purchaser, but
as the debtor had it at the time of the filing of the petition, subject
to all valid claims. 26
Since the defense of the bank, that without notice of the filing of the
petition it had a duty to honor the checks when presented, was valid
against the bankrupt before the filing of the petition, it was also valid
against the trustee after his appointment. In utilizing this argument, the
majority ignored the fact that there are instances in which a trustee's
power over the property is far greater than the bankrupt's was before
the filing: the trustee can set aside fraudulent conveyances under State
or Federal Law or under the Bankruptcy Act, he can avoid certain liens
on the bankrupt's property, and he can avoid preferential transfers.2 7
Much of the strength of the majority's argument is diluted upon the
realization that there are instances when the trustee can do certain things
which the bankrupt could never do. The majority would have had a
much stronger argument if they would have demonstrated more con-
vincingly that this was not an instance where the power of the trustee
was greater than that of the bankrupt. This argument is extremely
significant because the Court adopted it in toto from the brief of
the California Bankers Association as amicus curiae in the Court of
Appeals.28
The second argument which the Court used is that of the equities
of the situation. Bankruptcy proceedings have long been treated as basic-
ally proceedings in equity.
"This court has held that for many purposes courts of bankruptcy
are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently
proceedings in equity. A Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity
in the sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the Act, it applies the principles and rules of the equity
jurisprudence. 29
The Court then reasoned that the equities in this case are clearly with
the bank, 0 since they received no notice of the proceedings before hon-
oring the checks. There is no question that to hold the bank liable in this
25Uniform Commercial Code §4-402: "A payor bank is liable to its customer
for damages proximately'caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item."
26 Zartmann v. First National Bank, 216 U.S. 134, 138 (1910).
274 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §70.14 (14th ed. 1962).28Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 191 (1965).
29 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-305 (1939). Cf. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
30 The Court o Appeals also agreed on this point. Bank of Marin v. England,
352 F.2d 186, 190 (1965).
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situation would be highly inequitable, yet it seems that the Court dis-
regards one of its former pronouncements in reaching its decision.
There are certain limitations placed upon the application of equitable
principles in a bankruptcy proceeding, and one of these is that although,
"A court of bankruptcy is a court of equity, and is guided by equitable
principles, this is only insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Act.' 31 The application of equitable principles here clearly
produces a result which is inconsistent with the cumulative effect of
70(d) (5) and 18(f). In a technical sense, the Court should not have
applied equitable principles to the controversy in the Marin case. From
a purely legal point of view, the statement in the dissenting opinion is
correct:
"The Court, in its haste to alleviate an indisputable inequity to
the bank, disregards, in my opinion, both the proper principles
of statutory construction and the most permanent interests of
bankruptcy administration."3 2
Although the majority's major premises are weak, there is a con-
sideration which is passed over lightly, but is highly determinative. Not
only are the equities on the side of the bank in this case, they are almost
overbearing in their weight. The effect of a decision to hold the innocent
bank liable would be to place an intolerable burden upon banks. If "The
bankruptcy of a drawer operates as a revocation of the drawee's author-
ity," and "Such revocation is not dependent upon or subject to notice
to the drawee, '33 the bank's duty would be impossible to perform. They
would be forced to maintain a perpetual scrutiny of bankruptcy records
in an effort to ascertain the hour-by-hour financial status of their de-
positors. The speed and efficiency required in present-day banking
transactions would be, for all practical purposes, impossible to achieve.
One of the possibilities for the banks, recommended by the Court of
Appeals, would be that they could keep themselves posted by reading
local legal publications. Yet, under the broad sweep of a decision affirm-
ing the bank's liability, the bank would be forced to keep itself informed
of bankruptcy proceedings in every Federal court in the United States.
The loss implicit in such a duty would be borne, not solely by the
banks, but by their depositors and other innocent third parties.
The Court of Appeals recognized these inequities, and that the bank
could never fully protect itself. It reasoned that since the Rosenthal case
and the present case were the only two reported involving this unique
fact situation, the occasions of the bank's liability would be few. The
,expenses which the bank would incur due to this liability should ".
31"S.E.C. v. U.S. Realty, 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1939). Cf. Bardes v. Hawarden Bank,
178 U.S. 524, 533-534 (1900).
32Bank of Marn v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
33 Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 190-191 (1965).
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be taken into account as a cost of the business."34 This rather weak logic
ignores the fact that an injustice would be done if the bank were to be
held liable when there is no way for them to avoid the liability. The
bank would be forced to bear a burden more logically borne by others,
and, in return, the scope of their liability without fault would be ex-
tended. In an analogous situation in an involuntary proceeding,
where the transfer occured between the time of filing and the time
of the adjudication, the Seventh Court of Appeals concluded that
the bank would be unable to protect itself in such a situation ".
except through the impossible
course of keeping itself advised not only daily, but momentarily,
of the filing of the petitions for adjudication of bankruptcy against
its depositors."' 35
The same effect would follow if the bank were to be held liable here.
The decision of the Court is the only one tenable in any consideration
of present banking techniques and the burden placed upon the bank
in such a situation.6
The Court specifies that the bank will not be liable in such a situation
unless they receive notice before the transaction, but the decision does
not specify what the notice should be. The Court does say that the
notice which is necessary is one ". . . reasonably calculated, under all
of the circumstances, to apprise the interested persons of the pendency
of the action." 37 In the Marin case, there are no guidelines laid down
which define "reasonable notice". In a case involving the same re-
quirement of reasonable notice in a different legal setting, the Court
has said:
"Notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person
whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable,
and whose legally protected interests are directly involved. 3 8
The facts in the Marin case fall squarely within the elements necessary
for the application of the rule in the Schroeder case. Since the bankrupt
has voluntarily placed himself in the custody of the court, it is only
reasonable that the duty to notify the interested parties should fall to
Id. at 191.
35 Citizens Union National Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1923).
36 In cases of an individual's voluntary petition in bankruptcy, the precise prob-
lem in the Marin case would probably never arise. A potential bankrupt has
the right to convert a reasonable amount of non-exempt personal property
into exempt property, thus avoiding the claims of creditors on this amount.
Thus, the money in a bank account could be withdrawn and used to purchase
exempt property such as furniture, foodstuffs, an automobile, or to pay the
cost of the attoney's fees in the forthcoming bankruptcy proceeding. See
Comstock v. Bechtel, 63 Wis. 656, 24 N.W. 465 (1885). Cf. Leuterman v.
Aschermann, 164 Wis. 162, 159 N.W. 718 (1916); In re Wood, 147 F. 878
(7th Cir. 1906).
37 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Cf.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 325 U.S. 112 (1956).
38 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-213 (1962).
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him. Since the appointment of a trustee is often delayed in a case of a
voluntary petition, there is an interval after the adjudication where there
is no person, other than the court, whose duty it is to protect the inter-
ests of the creditors and of the other parties. In this interval, the bank-
rupt should assume that duty. The burden of fulfilling that duty will
not be onerous for the bankrupt, since all of the pertinent facts are natu-
rally within his knowledge. A personal visit or a short telephone call
would be sufficient to fulfill the requirement. This notice would immedi-
ately divest the bank, and other parties, of any defense if they subse-
quently transferred any property of the bankrupt."
Because the rationale behind the Court's decision, as stated, is rather
weak, and because the decision is not based upon any statutory interpre-
tation, there is some question as to the relevance of the case as an impor-
tant precedent. In future cases in this area, it is quite possible that this
decision will be designated as a mistake, or limited to the unique fact
situation in the Marin case. Because the equities in this type of situation
are so overwhelming upon the side of the bank, it seems that there
should be some sounder basis upon which to rest the decision. One
possibility for a more secure ground of decision can be achieved by a
fuller and more realistic analysis of the contract relationship between
the depositor and the bank.
As the Court states, the deposit of the money in the bank creates
the legal relationship of debtor and creditor between the bank and the
depositor. The money has been deposited by the creditor in return for
the promise of the bank. The bank has the duty to fulfill the contract
by paying out the money in the account in accordance with the orders
of the depositor. When the depositor issues a check, he is authorizing the
bank to pay the money to the named payee. In the Matin case, the trustee
argued that since the rule is that the issuance of the check, without more,
does not constitute an assignment,40 the honoring of the check by the
bank after the adjudication in bankruptcy is a transfer within the mean-
ing of 70(d) (5). Looking at the "no-assignment" rule from both a
historical and a realistic point of view, the argument to the contrary is
extremely strong.
The doctrine of no-assignment was enacted primarily as a protection
for banks and its effect was intended to be limited as between the
drawer and the drawee bank. Prior to the adoption of the rule, it was
39 In the event of death or incompetence of the drawer, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has taken a very liberal view of the effect of actual notice upon
the drawee bank's duty; Uniform Commercial Code §4-405: "(1)... Neither
death nor incompetence of a customer revokes such authority . . . until the
bank knows of the fact of the death or of an adjudication of incompetence
and has reasonable opportunity to act on it . . . (2) Even with knowledge a
bank may for 10 days after the date of death pay or certify checks drawn on
or prior to that date unless ordered to stop payment by a person claiming an
interest in the account."
40 See note 18, supra.
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often held that the mere issuance of the check was an assignment as
between all of the parties, and this is still the law in some of the con-
tinental countries.4 1 The problems and inequities implicit in such a rule
are all such that the drawee bank must bear the heavier burden under
the system. How does the bank determine in what order the checks
are to be honored-chronologically by presentment or according to the
bank's numbering system? What effect, if any, does a stop payment or-
der from the drawer have upon the assignment which occurs at the is-
suance of the check? To avoid these problems and the possibility of
double liability for the bank, the no-assignment doctrine was enacted.
This doctrine was never intended to operate in derogation of the rights
of the bank, yet that would be the harsh result if the application of the
no-assignment doctrine were allowed in the manner argued for by the
trustee.
Looking at the issuance of the check realistically, there is actually
an assignment by the drawer to the payee when the check is issued. The
drawer is giving up his right to the funds which are in the hands of the
bank to the payee. The important consideration here is that this assign-
ment occurs as between the drawer and the payee, while the no-assign-
ment rule is meant to operate as between the drawer and the drawee
bank, or as between the payee and the drawee bank. Thus, the no-
assignment doctrine would still fulfill its original function while at the
same time the realities of the situation would be faced up to. When
the bank honors the check, they do not really assign anything to the
payee, for they are merely fulfilling their contract duty.
Applying this reasoning to the situation in the Marin case, the same
equitable result is reached. The transfer as between the drawer and the
payee is deemed to have occured at the issuance of the check, which was
before the adjudication of bankruptcy. The only event which occured
after the adjudication was the honoring of the check by the bank. The
bank is obviously not liable for fulfilling their contract duty without
notice. Notice of the adjudication of bankruptcy would have the same
effect on the bank's rights, that is, they would have no right to honor
the checks. If the above rationale is used, a transfer of the funds which
is a preference within the meaning of section 60 can still be avoided by
the trustee. Thus, the innocent bank would be free from liability and
the effect of the reasoning would be ". . . to permit the trustee to obtain
recovery only against the party that benefitted from the transaction."42
The two primary ends sought to be attained in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding are the protection of the creditors and the speedy and efficient
4' Farnsworth, The Check In France & The United Slates-A Comparative
Study, 36 TUL. L. REv. 245 (1962).
42 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 104 (1966).
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settlement of the estate.4 3 These should not be deemed as exclusive, and
innocent third party banks should not be forced to carry a heavy liability
to serve those ends. The IM/arin case loosens the absolute grip of the
trustee on the property of the bankrupt, and, in so doing, achieves
another end which should be sought in bankruptcy proceedings. If the
Court would have placed the decision on surer grounds, we could be
sure of further equitable results in this area. As it is, we can only hope
that the Court will continue on its present path.
PATRICK M. RYAN
Criminal Law: Self-Incrimination: Right to Counsel: After
having been indicted for conspiring to rob a federally insured
bank and after counsel had been appointed to represent him, the accused
was placed in a lineup for identification purposes. In the lineup he was
required to repeat the words used by the robber, as were the others in
the lineup. His appointed counsel was not notified and was not present.
Although the United States Supreme Court held in United States v.
Wade1 that the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had not been infringed, it did hold that his Sixth Amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel had been violated. While the
opinion of the Court and the separate opinions of Justices Black,
White and Fortas are helpful in clarifying certain questions in the
law, they do raise further questions which are left unanswered.
The first part of the Court's opinion relates to the alleged violation
of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. There are two basic
theories of what constitutes self-incrimination. The first is that self-
incrimination includes any compulsion of an individual to cooperate in
any way in his prosecution. The second is that self-incrimination includes
only compelled communication from an individual. The Court stated in
Schmerber v. California2 that only evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature falls within the privilege. In Wade the Court makes it
clear that all speech is not necessarily communicative, even when the
words uttered are those used by the person who committed the crime:
".... he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical char-
acteristic, not to speak his guilt."'3 Mr. Justice Black in his dissent from
this point relies on his dissent in Schmerber,4 where he suggested that
obtaining any evidence from the suspect by compulsion violates the Fifth
Amendment privilege. He does not imply, however, that Schmerber is
43 Kuechner v. Irving Trust, 299 U.S. 445, 452 (1937). Cf. Bailey v. Grover, 88
U.S. 342, 346 (1874).1388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), where a blood sample was taken from a suspect
(over his objection) to determine its alcohol content.
3 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
4 384 U.S. 757, 773 (1966).
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